Breaking up is hard to do: Why disinvestment in medical technology is harder than investment by Haas, M et al.
1 
 
Breaking up is hard to do: why disinvestment 
in medical technology is harder than 
investment 
Marion Haas PhD, Professor, Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation, 
University of Technology  
Jane Hall PhD, Professor, Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation, 
University of Technology  
Rosalie Viney PhD, Associate Professor, Centre for Health Economics Research and 
Evaluation, University of Technology  
Gisselle Gallego PhD, Adjunct Lecturer, 2Community Based Health Care Research Unit, 
Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Sydney, 
Corresponding author. Email: marion.haas@chere.uts.edu.au 
 
Abstract 
Health care technology is a two-edged sword- it offers new and better treatment to a 
wider range of people and at the same time is a major driver of increasing costs in 
health systems.  Many countries have developed sophisticated systems of Health 
Technology Assessment (HTA) to inform decisions about new investments in new 
health care interventions. In this paper we question whether HTA is also the 
appropriate framework for guiding or informing disinvestment decisions. 
In exploring the issues related to disinvestment, we first discuss the various HTA 
frameworks which have been suggested as a means of encouraging or facilitating 
disinvestment. We then describe available means of identifying candidates for 
disinvestment (Comparative Effectiveness Research, clinical practice variations, clinical 
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practice guidelines) and for implementing the disinvestment process (PBMA and 
related techniques). 
In considering the possible reasons for the lack of progress in active disinvestment we 
suggest that HTA is not the right framework as disinvestment involves a different 
decision making context. The key to disinvestment is not just what to stop doing but 




Key Question Summary 
What is known about this topic? 
Disinvestment is an increasingly popular topic amongst academics and policy makers. 
Most discussions focus on the need to increase disinvestment as a corollary of 
investment, the lack of overt disinvestment decisions and the use of a framework based 
on health technology assessment (HTA) to implement disinvestment.  
What does this paper add? 
This paper focuses on the difficulties associated with deciding which technologies to 
disinvest in and the problems in using an HTA framework to make such decisions 
when disinvestment involves a different decision making context from that of 
investment. 
What are the implications for practitioners? 
The key to disinvestment is not just what to stop doing but how to implement such 




Developments in health care technology, including drugs, diagnostic and procedural 
interventions, have had a major impact on the scope of health care, by expanding the 
range of people who can be offered treatment and the complexity of the treatments 
available. But health technology is also a major driver of rising health care costs. Thus, it 
not surprising that most attention has been directed toward developing a robust 
framework to evaluate new technologies proposed for introduction into health care 
practice. The development of formal health technology assessment (HTA) can be traced 
to the early 1970s and was stimulated in part by a concern to assure the safety and 
efficacy of new interventions, but also by concern about rising costs, and the need to 
ensure that new technologies represented good buys1. Although HTA encompasses 
many perspectives, including ethical, societal, and legal issues, its core focus is the 
evaluation of safety, efficacy and cost-effectiveness of alternative treatments or other 
procedures; and, at least for new and emerging technologies, to ensure they provide 
‘value for money’.  
By focusing health technology assessment (HTA) efforts on new investment, many 
technologies in general use have never been appropriately evaluated, and their cost-
effectiveness is unknown. The early advocates of HTA argued that if new technologies 
were accepted for funding on the basis of cost-effectiveness, the armamentarium of 
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funded technologies would, over time, become more cost-effective as the new 
(evaluated) technologies replaced the existing ones, thus improving the efficiency of the 
health system. However, as long as they remain safe and are not shown to do harm, 
existing technologies are generally not reviewed; thus their relative value for money is 
unknown. 
In Australia, for example, although new technologies have been subject to formal HTA 
for over a decade, only about three percent of all technologies currently reimbursed 
have been subject to formal review2. In addition, many technologies are approved for 
reimbursement on a cost-minimisation basis, providing the same health outcome for the 
same cost as existing technologies. The implicit assumption is that there will be no 
additional cost from the new technology/procedure. However, in practice, these new 
treatments often become additional to rather than alternatives to the already funded 
treatments, creating pressure for additional spending.  
The aim of this paper is to explore a number of issues related to disinvestment in light 
of recent discussion in the literature. Disinvestment refers to processes by which a 
health system or service removes technologies, without necessarily replacing them.  
First, we describe current approaches to encourage or facilitate disinvestment by 
applying existing HTA methods and processes. Second, we briefly discuss potential 
means of identifying candidate technologies for disinvestment; and some approaches to 
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the implementation of a disinvestment process. Third, we discuss the possible reasons 
for the lack of progress and the challenges of designing a framework for disinvestment 
in health technologies.  
 
Disinvestment through Health Technology Assessment  
The term disinvestment is used with a range of meanings and there are different ways 
of examining this concept.  
Elshaug et al defined it as “the process of withdrawing (partially or completely) health 
resources from any existing health care practices, procedures, technologies and 
pharmaceuticals that are deemed to deliver no or low health gain for their cost and thus 
[do] not [represent] efficient health resource allocation”3.  Disinvestment has also been 
described as the cessation or restriction of potentially harmful, clinically ineffective or 
cost inefficient practices4. Even though Goodman does not define disinvestment, 
obsolete/outmoded/abandoned technologies are described as those that have been 
superseded or demonstrated to be ineffective or harmful5.   
The disinvestment process could also be described as explicit or implicit. Person et al 
identified explicit disinvestment as the process of taking resources from one service in 
order to use them for other purposes (i.e. reallocation of resources) (Pearson and 
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Littlejohns, 2007). “Implicit” disinvestment is best described as replacement/updating of 
practice and it occurs when a technology or intervention is superseded and therefore 
falls out of use. Definitions are diverse and demonstrate that apart from reasons of 
safety, there are no agreed operational criteria for disinvestment.  
 
Several countries have formal HTA programs but, although there is a view that a 
similar approach can be used to implement disinvestment3, 4, there is little evidence that 
active disinvestment is occurring6. In Australia, a recent review found that existing 
HTA processes are focused on the assessment of new technologies7. The operation of 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC), includes explicit criteria for 
removing a drug from the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), but products de-listed 
to date have been largely as a result of new information becoming available about 
effectiveness and safety, or voluntary withdrawal by the manufacturer. Thus, any 
disinvestment that occurs in medicines in Australia tends to be implicit, resulting from 
the replacement in clinical use of current drugs with new, more effective drugs. 
Similarly, for the Medical Benefits Scheme (MBS), delisting has occurred through the 
Australian Department of Health and Ageing, generally as a result of an existing item 
falling into disuse. Although the review commented that “it will become increasingly 
difficult for governments to fund new health technologies unless they have the capacity 
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to identify and remove funding for those that are less effective” none of the 
recommendations address how it might be achieved7. 
In contrast to this, the UK National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
has a mandate “to identify and stop ineffective interventions and make health services 
more equitable across the country”8. Strategies used include technology appraisals, 
clinical guidelines and commissioning guidelines. The last are web based guides 
designed to set benchmarks for service levels, and advice on issues such as local needs 
assessment and opportunities for disinvestment9. NICE has identified 102 interventions 
for which there is little or no evidence of benefit; 27 are covered by guidance, guidance 
is being developed for a further 30 and further assessment is being considered for 4510. 
As yet there is no clear evidence that disinvestment has been successfully implemented, 
which may be because the process relies on uptake of guidance at the health service 
level.  
Germany provides a possible example of active disinvestment. After an evaluation by 
the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG), the Federal Joint 
Committee (FJC) drugs can be placed on a “negative” list and will not be reimbursed by 
the German statutory sickness funds. In Canada, the Ministry of Health and the Ontario 
Medical Association agreed to identify services “not medically necessary” in response 
to 1990s fiscal cuts. Candidate technologies were reviewed by an ad hoc commission of 
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individuals representing the Ministry, the Medical Association, consumers, and 
academia, and several services were excluded or partially excluded from insurance 
cover10.  However the “principles were not well articulated or publicized by the decision 
makers”11.  A recent report by the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in 
Health (CADTH) discusses disinvestment, barriers to its implementation and some 
proposed approaches, but does not provide a description of what is currently 
happening in Canada or elsewhere11.  The Danish Centre for Evaluation and Health 
Technology Assessment (DACEHTA) initiated a pilot project in 2004 to “assess 
improper use or potentially obsolete technologies” with a focus on imaging 
technologies.  The rationale is not reported and the information available is limited to a 
conference abstract12.  There have been two Spanish projects aimed at disinvestment10.  
Both involved developing a guide to identify and assess obsolete technologies, but little 
information has been published13.  
This overview of processes across a range of countries demonstrates that disinvestment 
in cost-ineffective technologies as a component of HTA is still a rare, relatively slow 
process. The focus of formal health technology assessment and cost-effectiveness 
evaluation in most countries that have such formal processes is heavily weighted 
towards decisions about whether to invest in or fund new health technologies, hence 
favouring increased expenditure that is justified by increased health outcomes. In some 
systems the technology appraisal decision leads to an explicit decision to increase 
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funding to adopt the technology (for example PBAC and MSAC in Australia), in other 
countries there may not be the same explicit decision, but there is rarely identification of 
which technologies within the existing budget will be defunded to allow the new 
technology to be adopted.  In addition, there are two stages to disinvestment- 
identifying cost-ineffective technologies, and implementing the disinvestment process. 
While the first may happen, the second does not automatically follow.  
 
Identifying candidate technologies for disinvestment 
Comparative Effectiveness Research (CER), research into clinical practice variations and 
clinical practice guidelines have been suggested as potential means of identifying 
candidate technologies for disinvestment.  CER involves the systematic appraisal of the 
benefits and risks of alternative treatments and other health care interventions (e.g. 
screening)14; and a new over-arching, public-private, co-ordinating agency, the Patient 
Outcomes Research Institute (PORI), has been established to oversee the program 
although its Charter specifically excludes any consideration of economic implications15-
18. The provision of information from evaluations is expected to change technology use 
by facilitating better decisions by clinicians as well as consumers, purchasers and policy 
makers. A list of priority topics for review has been developed by the Institute of 
Medicine19. The development of the candidate topics was a major exercise in itself.  
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Variations in the use of health services and per capita expenditure have been observed 
widely, over countries and over time, much of it unexplained by differences in 
population characteristics or without improved health outcomes 20.  The large literature 
covering this topic has been driven by a perceived need to identify causes of clinical 
variation amenable to intervention. So systematic investigations of practice variations 
may identify candidate technologies for disinvestment. 
Clinical practice guidelines are designed, inter alia, to reduce the use of unnecessary, 
ineffective or harmful interventions21.  Guidelines are most appropriately based on a 
process of systematic identification and synthesis of the best available evidence, as is 
CER.  Guidelines in themselves are not a disinvestment strategy, as many recommend 
additional interventions. However, they should identify not just what should be done, 
but what should not be done, enabling candidate technologies to be identified for 
disinvestment.  
Implementing disinvestment 
Little attention has been given to implementing a disinvestment decision. When 
guidelines were first developed, it was assumed that the provision of evidence-based 
information would by itself change practice so that ineffective interventions would be 
replaced by those recommended in the guideline. But experience has shown that 
dissemination is not sufficient to ensure implementation, and that other strategies and 
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incentives are required21.  In addition, even interventions deemed ineffective or cost-
ineffective in one clinical context may be effective in another, and therefore should be 
available. 
One approach to reallocating resources within a specific context is Program Budgeting 
and Marginal Analysis (PBMA), which has now been used for over 30 years in the 
health sector22.  It involves a formal assessment of the costs and benefits of alternatives 
within a management context of planning and priority setting. Even in this context 
activities for investment are identified far more readily than are those for disinvestment. 
Similar approaches, such as ACE (Assessing Cost Effectiveness) Health Sector Wide 
Disease Based Model, Health Benefits Group/Health Resource Group, have been 
described23-28.  
Another approach to changing practice patterns is the use of pay for performance29. 
While ideally this would mean paying for improved health outcomes, the problem is 
that it is difficult to reward better outcomes directly, as there are many influences 
beyond medical care that affect final outcomes and considerable time between the 
medical intervention and the outcome. Thus in practice, incentives have been directed 
towards reinforcing appropriate care, such as in the UK Quality and Outcomes 
Framework, under which GPs are rewarded for achievement of nearly 200 specified 
indicators30 or various US pay for performance schemes31. Results available from the 
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evaluation of schemes in this rapidly developing field of research indicate that such 
incentives may change practice32, results are mixed33, 34 and these schemes are open to 
gaming35. Another approach emphasises the use of performance reporting to enhance 
the role of consumers in choosing their own health insurance, in managed competition 
markets, or their choice of clinician, hospital and/or treatment33. New organizational 
structures use various forms of budget holding and blended payments to enhance the 
purchasing or commissioning of appropriate treatment, including the efficient use of 
technologies36,37. 
Challenges to implementing a program of active disinvestment 
So far, disinvestment has been seen as a corollary of investment. However, the 
questions relating to investment and disinvestment are fundamentally different.  Other 
reviews of this topic conclude that lack of resources for research into established 
technologies, inadequate resources and lack of political, clinical and administrative will 
to support the process are factors which impede implementation4, 24. Although these 
may be significant barriers, a major challenge is to identify which technologies are 
candidates for disinvestment. Even in the reported pilot studies, there is little 
description of the actual process used to identify technologies for disinvestment; and in 
the US, the CER program involved a major review exercise to identify candidate 
technologies and there are currently more than 100 topics on the priority list.  
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An understanding of incentives helps to explain why this is so. In the case of new 
technologies, there is a clear incentive for initiating an appraisal, particularly when the 
HTA process is linked to funding and/or reimbursement. For existing technologies, 
unless there is new evidence of positive harm, there is little to gain in removing access. 
There is an option value for clinicians and patients in having the technology available 
and funded. Similarly, the use of PBMA relies on managers and clinicians to identify 
areas of disinvestment; they will have no incentive to do so if the freed resources will 
not be available to fund alternative interventions or services in the same program. 
Implications for health services decision makers 
The key to disinvestment is not just what technologies to cease funding but how to 
create the right environment for this to occur- in other words, how to establish and 
implement disincentives to use technologies it is considered desirable to cease using. It 
is important to recognise that an active program or strategy of disinvestment will create 
losses, to clinicians, to consumers and to providers of the technology. At the same time, 
the additional benefits and/or savings from any disinvestments may not be realised for 
a considerable period of time and there is a risk that, for some products, interventions 
or services, cost savings, in particular, may not be realised. Moreover, the gains from 
disinvestment are likely to be more diffuse and less readily specified than any losses. 
Hence losers have a stronger incentive to lobby for the continuation of the status quo, 
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than gainers do for effecting the change. In short, linking HTA to reimbursement 
decisions provides a strong incentive for new technologies to be identified and subject 
to appraisal. There are disincentives for disinvestment, and the process of identifying 
the target technologies is made more complex by this.  
Because removing resources is easier than providing additional resources, the threshold 
for disinvestment may need to be different from the threshold for investment. Further, 
if decision makers are serious about disinvestment, they may also need to be more 
stringent in deciding what level of evidence and what level of cost-effectiveness is 
acceptable for funding a new technology. That is, the challenges associated with 
disinvestment bring additional challenges for the standards applied to investment 
decisions. 
Our conclusion is that the impetus for disinvestment relies on changing practice and 
such change can only come from changing incentives. These might apply to clinicians, 
but also to consumers and funders. The continued debate about disinvestment must 
recognise the role of incentives, and future work should evaluate how changing 
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